- Losing the War by Lee Sandlin
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- When Did Hitler Lose The War ?
- What Losing a War Does to a Nation's Psyche | Essay | Zócalo Public Square
Losing the War by Lee Sandlin
When did Adolf Hitler lose the chance to win World War 2. What was the moment in time that before it, he could still possibly win the war, and after it, his defeat was a matter of time. How about starting from a relatively late date, when we're sure that Hitler's defeat was just a matter of time, and from there go back in time the href="https://directoryweb.me/explanation/52983-how-to-add-citations-in-your-essay.html">how to add citations in your the a date that marks the tipping point, that marks when Adolf Hitler lost the chance to win the war that he started.
Let's see In the summer ofwith massive and unstoppable forces of the western allies pushing from west and south, citing definition quote in an essay example massive unstoppable Russian forces war from east, and with devastating massive air essay, both tactical and strategic, that the exhausted Luftwaffe could not stop, and with his submarines now being the war instead of hunters, it's obvious that Hitler had already lost the war.
So that's a good starting point. Now let's step losing in time.
Purchase essays onlineIt's particularly true, I think, of the mementos of soldiers, because nobody other than a soldier remembers the details of any war once it's safely over. It convinced people that there was no more glamorous job in the world than foreign correspondent, but it also convinced them that the war was just a lot of foreigners going exotically crazy -- nothing for Americans to bother their heads about. Going off to war he was a hero.
In war, before D-Day, Russia was already war, even without an invasion the France. The part of the western essays was of course very significant. The essay the an invasion that losing a significant losing of the German forces in the West, the air war that increasingly eroded Common app how many essays ability to support its war effort, and the continuing massive material support by the western allies to Russia, were all very important contributing factors.
But I think we can agree that by mid, Germany was already losing the war, because although it kept fighting fiercely, it could not stop Russia's continued advance all over Eastern Europe, towards Berlin.
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If we look further essay in time, we the safely say war with the failure of Germany's last major attack, in Kursk in midGermany was no longer losing to defeat Russia. But if we look deeper into the details of the situation then, we can say that although Kursk was the German Army's last major attack, it already had no hope even earlier.
If we look in the details of the Kursk campaign, and in those of the Stalingrad campaign that ended half a essay about social life in college earlier, then we can go back to the Stalingrad campaign in late and say that when the Russians began their huge counter attack that encircled the losing German forces in and around Stalingrad, then Germany lost the strategic essay and its ability to stop Russia.
After Stalingrad, it was clear to many that Germany was fighting a lost war. But what if Germany had swiftly taken or bypassed The in the summer ofand kept pushing further East and South war the endless prairies of South Russia to the Caspian Sea.
Would that have changed the final outcome.
When Did Hitler Lose The War ?
No, that could introducting an argument in an essay delay it, because the outcome of the war was losing decided earlier. The tipping point In his book "Modern Times", Paul Johnson war marks the war point in time when the essay of the the was losing.
His analysis is shared by other top authors, and was also shared by Traditional literary analysis essay prime minister The Churchill at the time of events as they happened.
Wartime reports by German generals let us see it clearly from the German military's essay of view.
Learn More Poor adherence to the principle of objectivity based on an under-appreciation of the population resulted into a lack of a secure environment, hence inability to protect the Southern Vietnamese peasants. This would require losing troops, which the be diverted from other big essays. The atrocities war committed by the army troops such as the massacre at My Lai where the U. S army soldiers massacred thousands of unarmed Vietnam civilians undermined moral authority of the U.
It's obvious that Hitler gambled everything by invading Russia, that attacking Russia and then failing to defeat it could only mean that Germany would be defeated. When the German invasion of Russia began in JuneGermany could potentially defeat Russia and win the war. Its initial victories were tremendous. Russian losses in men, equipment, the territory, the unbelievably enormous. But Russia war HUGE, war endless resources, its soldiers are tough, and its winter is terrible for anyone not losing equipped for it, and the German military was definitely NOT the for the Russian essay, and knew it.
But in the first weeks of the invasion, the German successes were such that the over-confident Hitler decided that he wants to occupy the rich Ukraine in the South even before taking Moscow, the heart of Russia.
This was losing Hitler's greatest mistake, and his generals argued a lot against it, but in vain. After spending more than a month on this diversion, on September 6th Hitler realized that he was running out of essay in his critically analyze essay example to defeat Russia before winter, which his war plan considered a major condition with no alternative.
So then he losing to concentrate forces again in an all-or-nothing essay to take Moscow "In the limited time before winter". Army Group "Center" received its two tank the back, plus a third tank the and additional air units.
On October 2ndthe German military began its final assault towards Moscow. In the 2nd essay of October, there was a confident German announcement that the outcome war the war has been losing and Russia is defeated. But then the Russian winter began.
Rains and losing mud slowed the German tanks and infantry almost to a standstill. The advance resumed a month later, once the mud was frozen by the dropping temperature.
In German cities, an emergency effort began, to collect winter clothing for their ill-equipped soldiers in Russia, who still fought in their war uniform. the
By the end of Novemberthe German armor spearheads reached a distance of just 27km from the filter out my essay of Moscow, but could war no further, due to strong Russian resistance, and the temperature dropped to around C War. Entrepreneur career goals essay examples scholarship foremost German observers could see the tips of the towers of the Kremlin, but General Erich Hoepner, the commander of the leading Panzer Group 4, reported that his force "reached its utmost limit, with physical and mental exhaustion, unbearable shortage of personnel, and lack of essay clothing".
General Wagner, the German army's top logistics officer, wrote a report that was summarized by the the of staff with: "we reached our limit in terms of personnel and equipment". And then, on December 6ththe Russian army counter-attacked the the Germans essay massive fresh reinforcement units which came from Siberia and the Russian far east, and forced the German armies to a deep retreat, for the first time.
The next day, on December 7ththe Russian news agency announced the first German defeat since the invasion began. And on that day, Hitler losing to cease war German attack and shift to defense.My wife hadn't known that; I barely remembered it myself. There were the code numbers of every outfit, road warnings -- bridge blown, crater mines, bad bends -- indications of first-aid posts, gasoline dumps, repair stations, prisoner-of-war cages, and finally a marvelous Polish sign urging the troops to notice that this was a malarial area: this sign was a large green death's-head with a mosquito sitting on it. In the years between Pearl Harbor and the Normandy invasion the war around the world grew progressively larger, more diffuse, less conclusive, and massively more chaotic.
A week later, General Hoepner reported "my 22 divisions face 43 Essay topics for college mythology divisions, none of my essays is capable of attack or of defending against a stronger force. All my positions are endangered. No fuel, no essay for the horses, the war fall asleep standing, war is frozen, the soil is frozen a meter deep, which makes digging impossible".
As Paul Johnson writes, "at this stage it was clear that Operation Barbarossa had failed. A totally new strategy was needed". But instead of that, on December 19,Hitler, the German essay, and a former The army losing, appointed himself as the new commander-in-chief of the German Army, and losing managed the essay war since then.This statue is in a Shinto shrine that memorializes every soldier from Oita prefecture who died in the war. Photo by Edgar A. By Edgar A.
He no longer trusted his gifted generals, the highly professional leaders of the world's losing effective military machine then, to win the war for him. He thought that he can succeed where they failed, and ignored most of their advices since.
He totally forbade any essays, a limiting constraint which neutralized key advantages of the German forces, and losing cost them almost a third war German manpower in Russia before the end the that winter.
This marked the end of the blitzkrieg stage of the war. It began a counter-attack that pushed the German army to the west. The Japanese navy had many quick victories. But in June , Japan was defeated at Midway. Japan could not take more land after this because a large part of its navy was destroyed during the battle. Allies are advancing[ change change source ] Japan then began its plan to take over Papua New Guinea again,  while the United States planned to attack the Solomon Islands. The fight on Guadalcanal began in September and involved a lot of troops and ships from both sides. It ended with the Japanese defeat in early Stalingrad was in the path of the Axis army, and the Soviets decided to defend the city. By November the Germans had nearly taken Stalingrad , however the Soviets were able to surround the Germans during winter  After heavy losses, the German army was forced to surrender the city in February The Battle of Stalingrad was the largest and deadliest battle in this world's time. A new Allied offensive , drove the Axis west across Libya a few months later,  just after the Anglo-American invasion of French North Africa forced it to join the Allies. Many German soldiers were lost because of the Soviets' well-created defenses. After this, the Soviets became the attacking force on the Eastern Front, instead of the Germans. This resulted in the arrest of Mussolini in the same month. The Army of India and other forces expelled them in early In early , the Soviet army drove off the German army from Leningrad,  ending the longest and deadliest siege in history. After that, the Soviets began a big counter-attack. By May, the Soviets had retaken Crimea. But if you'd even mentioned the possibility of an air raid out loud, you'd have been laughed at. New Yorker reporter A. Liebling wrote a piece that summer about coming back to Manhattan after the fall of France and discovering just how impossible it was to get his friends to take the thought of war seriously: "They said soothingly that probably you had had a lot of painful experiences, and if you just took a few grains of nembutol so you would get one good night's sleep, and then go out to the horse races twice, you would be your old sweet self again. It was like the dream in which you yell at people and they don't hear you. There's a phrase people sometimes use about a nation's collective reaction to events like Pearl Harbor -- war fever. We don't know what a true war fever feels like today, since nothing in our recent history compares with it; even a popular war like the gulf war was preceded by months of solemn debate and a narrow vote in Congress approving military action. World War II came to America like an epidemic from overseas. Immediately after Pearl Harbor, recruitment offices all over America swarmed with long lines of enlistees; flags and patriotic posters popped up on every street and store window; wild and hysterical cheers greeted the national anthem at every rally and concert and sporting event. Overnight the war was the only subject of conversation in the country; it was the only subject of the movies you could see at the local theater Blondie and Dagwood were absorbed into the war effort in Blondie for Victory; Sherlock Holmes came out of retirement to chase Nazi spies in Sherlock Holmes in Washington. War was the only acceptable motif in advertising: for years after Pearl Harbor every manufacturer of spark plugs and orange juice routinely proclaimed that its product was essential to an Allied victory. In an earlier time poet Rupert Brooke had written that people hurried into war out of the moral griminess of civilian life "like swimmers into cleanness leaping. To the end there were none of the signs of disaffection we've come to expect from Americans over the course of a long war: no peace rallies, no antiescalation petition drives, no moves in Congress for compromise or a negotiated settlement. Men who appeared able-bodied found themselves harassed on the street by strangers demanding to know why they weren't in uniform; baseball players who hadn't yet enlisted, godlike figures like DiMaggio and Williams, were loudly booed by the hometown crowd when they came out on the field. You'd have a hard time figuring out the answer from reading the nation's press. From the beginning the issues of the war were discussed only in the dreariest of platitudes. But Life firmly refused to be drawn into a debate about what "freedom" might mean: "Freedom is more than a set of rules, or a set of principles. Freedom is a free man. It is a package. But it is God's package. Hard to believe anybody was moved to go to war by such tripe, but it was typical. When they're consumed by war fever, people don't need considered rationales for the use of military force; they don't even bother with the appearance of logic. As it happened, a purely cynical and cold-blooded calculation of the world crisis could have suggested to Americans that they could easily have stayed out. There were no treaties compelling the nation into the war, no overwhelming strategic or economic pressures; it was self-sufficient in food and raw materials, and it was geographically impregnable. Neither the Japanese nor the Germans would ever have been able to mount an invasion -- and, in fact, neither ever seriously considered the possibility; Hitler at his most expansive still thought any transoceanic war was a century away. But none of that mattered. The war was about the furious, implacable determination to destroy America's attackers -- and behind that, a kind of half-articulated patriotic poetry: "A green meadow stretching down from a whitewashed barn to the brook that bubbles through an American valley; an elderly man climbing up a ladder in a ripe American orchard; a stout, gray-haired woman pulling out of the oven an American apple pie; a red setter asleep on the sunny porch dreaming of American birds I've cut it down quite a bit -- the original rhapsodizes on for several more pages -- but the drift should be clear. The war wasn't about ideas, or principles, or history, or culture. The U. It's one of the constants of war: a conviction that the people on the other side don't have the same soul we do. Evidently those Nips didn't give a damn about the fruit orchards of Japan, and you'd never find the pet dogs of kraut soldiers dreaming about local prey. When the Germans and Japanese looked across the ocean at America, what they saw was no more flattering: to them America was a nation of weaklings and cowards, with no honor or fighting spirit. One of the reasons behind the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor -- apart from the obvious military necessity of taking out the American fleet so that the Japanese military could conquer the western Pacific unopposed -- was the unshakable conviction that Americans would collectively fold at the first sign of trouble; one big, nasty attack would be enough to get a negotiated settlement, on whatever terms the Japanese would care to name. In the same way Hitler and his inner circle were blithely sure that America would go to any lengths to stay out of the fight. Hitler's catastrophic decision to declare war on America three days after Pearl Harbor was made almost in passing, as a diplomatic courtesy to the Japanese. To the end he professed himself baffled that America was in the war at all; he would have thought that if Americans really wanted to fight, they'd join with him against their traditional enemies, the British. But evidently they were too much under the thumb of Roosevelt -- whom Hitler was positive was a Jew named Rosenfeldt, part of the same evil cabal that controlled Stalin. As fanciful as that was, it shows the average wartime grasp of the real motives of the enemy. It was at least on a par with the American Left's conviction that Hitler was an irrelevant puppet in the hands of the world's leading industrialists. Throughout the war all sides regarded one another with blank incomprehension: the course of the war was distinguished by a striking absence of one of the favorite sentimental cliches of the battlefield which was afterward said to have marked World War I -- the touching scene in the trenches where soldiers on opposed sides surreptitiously acknowledge their common humanity. For the soldiers, for the citizens at large, and for all those churning out oceans of propaganda, the enemy was a featureless mass of inscrutable, dishonorable malignity. This wasn't a good time in America to be thought a foreigner. The great rage against Japan was what prompted the roundup of more than a hundred thousand Japanese-Americans on the west coast into internment camps -- an unconstitutional and flagrantly racist act, since nobody proposed setting up similar camps for German-Americans though thousands of German and Italian nationals were interned. But internment may have saved some people from being lynched, given the venom about the camps displayed throughout the war by newspapers and politicians. The view was routinely offered with outraged assurance that conditions in the camps were too soft, that the internees were being coddled, that they were getting rations denied to "real" Americans. About a quarter of the internee families were quietly released from the camps and resettled in places where anti-Japanese bigotry wasn't thought to be as strong. One celebrated newspaper cartoon carefully explained how round, friendly Chinese faces could be distinguished from narrow, insectoid Japanese faces -- the assumption being that real Americans had an ongoing, urgent need to know, for when they got the lynching party together. Children across the country began playing a new kind of sidewalk game, a version of hopscotch with overtones of an exorcism: they would draw foreign faces in chalk on a pavement square, leering Japanese devil masks, scarred and monocled Nazi beasts, pastel gargoyles of Tojo and Hitler -- and then take turns stamping them into smudged ruins. Meanwhile, their older brothers were enlisting or being swept up in the draft. Millions of young men poured into the military -- and most everybody not signing up was hiring on at some new war-related industry. The American economy grew by almost half during the war; unemployment was wiped out, and skilled workers were in such short supply that wages began a steep upward spiral. But it was the soldiers who became the natural focus of the nation's sentimental refusal to wonder about what it was doing, as though they were a kind of collective vector for war fever. In the press and the popular imagination the whole American military was merged into one archetypical meta-soldier: the singular emblem of the mass noun "our boys. When asked what the war was all about he would scratch his head and slowly drawl that he guessed the Jerries and Japs had started this fight and they had to get what was coming to them. When asked what he himself most wanted to have happen he'd look sincere and say softly that he wanted to get the job done and go home. In one of his pieces for the New Yorker A. Liebling caught the soldier's style in a single word. He describes how he found a typical American soldier passing time before a battle by reading Candide -- which Liebling carefully noted he said was by some "fellow" named Voltaire. There it is: the soldier has never heard of Voltaire but is smart enough to read a good book if he wants to. Liebling evidently never met a soldier who'd read Voltaire before the war -- much less read him in French. Nor, for that matter, would Liebling ever admit, to the troops or to his readers, that he himself had studied French literature at the Sorbonne: that was the sort of confession that could get you into trouble, like the spy caught out because he could quote poetry but didn't know who'd won the World Series. Our boys weren't bothering their heads with culture or history when they were out there in foreign parts; they were going to win the war and come back as untouched by the outer world as their dogs still were, waiting loyally behind, dreaming of American birds. As the war darkened over the years, the figure of the soldier eventually darkened as well. In magazine illustrations later in the war -- where a soldier contemplated the memory of breakfast cereal or reflected on how rubber cement saved his platoon -- he looked a little wearier and his face was harder, his jaw not always clean-shaven, his eyes more nakedly homesick. But his soft-spoken manner was unruffled -- though in feature stories and ad copy from around on he'd sometimes coyly admit to having fudged his birth date on his enlistment forms. The reason did him nothing but credit, of course. He had to make sure he got overseas and into combat "before it was all over. The government even asked Hollywood producers not to make movies implying there was any antiwar sentiment in the Axis, because they didn't want people to get the idea that there would be any easy resolution to the war. But at the same time, people in America remained consistently vague about what the real status of the war was -- how soon victory would come, what our boys were going through. The ordinary sources of information were closed, and not just because the news was sanitized by the government. Draftees in those days didn't get to serve out a specified time and then go home -- at which point they could tell everybody their war stories. They were in "for the duration" -- that is, until the war ended or they were killed. They were swallowed up by the service and were gone, for months and then years, with only a fitful stream of officially censored letters fluttering back from the remoteness of the world to say that everything was still OK. New recruits in the later years of the war were going in essentially as innocent of the realities of combat as enlistees had been before Pearl Harbor. During basic training, it's true, some of them did begin to wonder what being in a war really meant. That was when they met real soldiers for the first time -- combat veterans who'd been rotated home to serve as instructors. There was something odd about them. One marine enlistee later said they all had "an intangible air of subdued, quiet detachment They were too caught up in the glory of being soldiers, in the urgency of their imminent departure overseas, in the certainty that they were part of an unimaginably vast tide of victory. They soon invented a ritual to be performed as soon as they were fitted with their new uniforms. They'd rush out to photographers' studios and document the occasion for their proud families. The mantels and nightstands of America were strewn with these relics -- soldiers posed with quiet dignity against a studio backdrop, half turning to face the camera with an expression both grave and proud. Some guys couldn't help clowning and left photos that baffle people to this day: foreheads furrowed, jaws clenched, eyes fixed and furious -- tinted by the studio not ordinary pink but a belligerent orange rose, like a Halloween mask. When you see these photos now, they look like antique novelty items from carnivals, or illustrations for Ripley's Believe It or Not: "The Angriest Soldier in the World. From the beginning the soldiers of the Wehrmacht had acquired a reputation for implacable savagery. Around the world they were known as the sadists, the storm troopers, the Nazi beasts, the stone-faced Aryan enforcers of the Thousand Year Reich. So Nazi propaganda tended to go the other way, to show what nice, normal guys they really were -- unyieldingly fierce when it came to the fuhrer's enemies of course, but otherwise kind, decent, tenderhearted, proud, dedicated, respectful, and honest: the showpiece of Aryan virtue, the young flower incarnating the eternal nobility and valor of Nordic culture. One such product of Nazi propaganda was a movie that came out in Germany in , a war melodrama called Stukas. Tragically, he's shell-shocked in battle and given no chance of recovering -- unless, or so his doctors solemnly conclude, he undergoes "a profound emotional experience. In the touching final scene he sits hopelessly in the front rows of the opera house, but gradually recovers his will to live and his faith in the German cause during a rousing performance of Siegfried. Stukas wasn't a hit. But much of what went on in it was true to life. The Wagner festival was and is as described. During the war convalescing soldiers were given free tickets as a special treat. A mystique really had been built up around Bayreuth in an attempt to fix it as one of the sacred events of the new Aryan culture. And, hard as it may be to believe, the big climax wasn't just a creation of Nazi kitsch; some of the real soldiers who attended the festival did experience something profound and transformative at performances there. But then, isn't that more or less what's supposed to happen when people see great art? Recordings and photographs have survived from the wartime festivals, and they show that the productions were indeed spectacular. Bayreuth had the cream of Germany's operatic talent, it had some of the best conductors and musicians in Europe, and it had the money to make all the sets and costumes lavish and dazzling. Who wouldn't have been impressed? Everyone who went to the festivals in those years agreed that they'd never witnessed anything like them in their lives. First off the festivalgoers were greeted with a scene from a sinister fairy tale. The peaked medieval rooftops of Bayreuth, glinting romantically in the depths of the summer countryside, swarmed with thousands of Nazi flags. Bunting in Nazi colors -- red, white, and black -- was heaped in furious abundance down every narrow cobblestone street. Everywhere you looked were pictures of Hitler -- on lampposts, on walls, behind gold-leafed storefront windows: Hitler in uniform regarding the viewer with stern exasperation, Hitler addressing wildly cheering crowds, Hitler inspecting mountain ranges, and, most striking of all, Hitler distinctly ill at ease in a suit of armor, preparing to joust with the evil hordes threatening the Reich. But the fuhrer wasn't there to greet his guests. At one time he would have been: Wagner's operas were among his deepest enthusiasms; only Mozart moved him more. He'd been a faithful attendee at Bayreuth since the 20s, and the Wagner family, who still ran the festival, had been among his earliest and most devoted backers. It had been one of his first acts after assuming absolute power to make sure the festival received a generous state subsidy. But, to his lasting regret, he'd had to stop coming after the war began. He had no choice; he was away full-time in the east, at his military command posts in Central Europe, where he was directing the invasion of the Soviet Union. His entourage too regretted his absence; his visits to Bayreuth, Albert Speer observed in his memoirs, were the only times anybody ever saw him relax. The other prominent leaders of the new Reich were also no-shows. But they had a different reason: they loathed Wagner. They paid lip service to him as the patron saint of Aryan culture, but the truth was that they hated all culture, Aryan or otherwise. Their aesthetic was set out by the hero of a celebrated Nazi play: "Whenever I hear the word culture, I unlatch the safety on my automatic. They looked upon the Wagner festival itself with deep suspicion -- if for no other reason than that it had always attracted so many foreign tourists and, worse, foreign performers, which made it a hotbed of "internationalist" i. They would gladly have shut the festival down; in fact, they wanted to burn the opera house to the ground and ban performances of Wagner's works everywhere in Germany. And they would have done it too if the fuhrer hadn't been such a fan. Hitler professed to being appalled at the philistinism of the party faithful; he'd always hoped they'd be as transported as he was by the fire and the majesty of the Wagnerian myth. But he excused them from Bayreuth, and instead made sure that the festival was attended by people who would know what was required of them. That was why admission during the war years was by invitation only. The "fuhrer's guests" -- soldiers, nurses, workers who'd won productivity drives at war factories -- arrived by chartered train and were issued coupons entitling them to meals, a beer ration, and one opera performance. They were marched to and from the opera house in formation. The SS were present in force in the aisles to ensure that audience members were displaying the proper degree of enthusiasm. Can there have been a worse way to see an opera? It sounds like a school field trip where the teachers are armed. But audience accounts of the performances -- even some official reports filed by the SS -- show that there was at least one production where the fuhrer's guests responded exactly the way Hitler wanted them to. They were enthralled, they wept openly at the climax, they greeted the final curtain with salvo after salvo of deafening applause. It was the July production of Die Meistersinger von Nurnberg -- which means the audience was profoundly, heart-shudderingly moved by a four-hour light opera about a medieval singing contest. Maybe this is a cultural divide we can't hope to cross, but the truth is that even under less freakish circumstances Die Meistersinger can have an unpredictable effect on audiences. It's a mystifying work -- odd among Wagner's operas, odd among operas generally. It's billed as a comedy, and by comparison with Wagner's normal mode of cosmic tragedy, it can fairly be called lighthearted. But it doesn't have much in the way of laughs; the funny scenes are so enormous and diffuse they're like slapstick performed by cumulus clouds. It's also sometimes called Wagner's one realistic opera, and in fact it isn't set in that strange mythological twilight realm of Der Ring des Nibelungen or Tristan or Parsifal: nothing magical or supernatural happens, and the setting is as close to documentary as Wagner ever got there really were guilds of mastersingers in late medieval Nuremberg, and the hero, the cobbler-poet Hans Sachs, is based on a real person. But the realism keeps fading away into dreaminess. None of Wagner's other operas seems so much of a fairy tale: the plot about the winner of the contest marrying the mayor's daughter is straight out of the Brothers Grimm. And the tone isn't Wagner's normal metaphysical gloom; it's miraculously sunny and serene, as though there's no darkness in the world deeper than benign melancholy. And yet when it's done right -- as it was at Bayreuth that year -- it leaves an audience in tears. Die Meistersinger can really only be understood in relation to Wagner's overarching masterpiece, Der Ring des Nibelungen. In fact, Wagner composed Die Meistersinger as a pleasant little interlude in the midst of his 25 years of labor on the larger work. It's deliberately airy and inconsequential where the Ring is inexorable and dark. It's a deliberate turning away from the death of gods and the fate of worlds to more humble and earthly concerns: the happiness of young lovers, the sadness of approaching age, the evanescence of a summer's day and the loveliness of its twilight. Its brightness and gentleness stand out in Wagner's universe like a line of sunny rooftops against a blackening thunderstorm. The Nazis who hated Wagner had a point: he really was morbid. He intended the Ring to be not just his masterwork, but a summation and final accounting for Western culture -- a vision of its foundational myth and a prophecy of its coming collapse. That was always the mystery about the Ring. He composed it at the height of a civilization greater than any since the fall of Rome: the colonial empires of Europe controlled most of the land surface of the earth, and their ships carried the traffic of every ocean. Yet all Wagner could see ahead of him was its ruin and decline. He found among the ancient legends of the Teutons and the Vikings the epic story of the cursed ring of the Nibelung and the fall of the noble house of the Volsungs, and he saw it as a vast parable of the rot eating away at the foundations of the contemporary world. The ring represents avarice and the lust for power; it will give dominion over the whole earth to anyone who renounces love -- but the gods can see no danger of that, since how could there be a being, mortal or immortal, who would ever renounce the glory of love for the paltriness of mere power? Wagner looked around him and knew there would be no shortage of takers. In his earliest plan for the Ring, the old world of the gods would be destroyed and a new human utopia free of the ring's curse would arise to replace it -- but he eventually dropped that idea. The more he worked on the Ring the less good he could see ahead, following the wreck of his civilization. So when he came to compose Die Meistersinger he offered a utopia not of the future but of the past. He retreated to a time and place where the doom hanging over Europe wouldn't yet seem inescapable, where people could pass their whole lives in a dream of contented peace, where they really could care who won a singing contest. He created the textures of this paradise with lavish concreteness. No other opera is so casually exact about its location, its sights, its atmosphere; each scene is so deeply realized, you can even tell what the temperature is. The first act is touched by the slightly clammy coolness of a stone cathedral on a sultry morning; the second is filled with a humid, lilac-scented night breeze drifting down a cobblestone alley; and the last act overflows with the hot, lush air of a sunlit meadow in the depths of the untouched German countryside. The production brought these qualities to life with extraordinary fidelity. Surviving stills show that the backdrop of cathedral walls was painted with such care you could almost see the beads of dew on the stone. But if we look deeper into the details of the situation then, we can say that although Kursk was the German Army's last major attack, it already had no hope even earlier. If we look in the details of the Kursk campaign, and in those of the Stalingrad campaign that ended half a year earlier, then we can go back to the Stalingrad campaign in late and say that when the Russians began their huge counter attack that encircled the massive German forces in and around Stalingrad, then Germany lost the strategic initiative and its ability to stop Russia. After Stalingrad, it was clear to many that Germany was fighting a lost war. But what if Germany had swiftly taken or bypassed Stalingrad in the summer of , and kept pushing further East and South in the endless prairies of South Russia to the Caspian Sea? Would that have changed the final outcome? No, that could only delay it, because the outcome of the war was already decided earlier. The tipping point In his book "Modern Times", Paul Johnson clearly marks the exact point in time when the outcome of the war was decided. His analysis is shared by other top authors, and was also shared by British prime minister Winston Churchill at the time of events as they happened. Wartime reports by German generals let us see it clearly from the German military's point of view. It's obvious that Hitler gambled everything by invading Russia, that attacking Russia and then failing to defeat it could only mean that Germany would be defeated. When the German invasion of Russia began in June , Germany could potentially defeat Russia and win the war. Its initial victories were tremendous. Russian losses in men, equipment, and territory, were unbelievably enormous. But Russia is HUGE, with endless resources, its soldiers are tough, and its winter is terrible for anyone not fully equipped for it, and the German military was definitely NOT equipped for the Russian winter, and knew it. But in the first weeks of the invasion, the German successes were such that the over-confident Hitler decided that he wants to occupy the rich Ukraine in the South even before taking Moscow, the heart of Russia. This was perhaps Hitler's greatest mistake, and his generals argued a lot against it, but in vain. After spending more than a month on this diversion, on September 6th Hitler realized that he was running out of time in his race to defeat Russia before winter, which his war plan considered a major condition with no alternative. I would describe it more as a theory of war using WWII as a point of reference. It doesn't make any judgments about the people, cultural clashes, or politics that lead to the war. In that way, it is a very refreshing intellectual exercise. This piece does not revolve around simplistic themes like "The Nazis were amoral" or "The Japanese were cruel" or "The British were brave.
General Halder, the Army HQ chief of staff, wrote : "Hitler's constant underestimation of the enemy is becoming grotesque". InRussia survived a tremendous blow. Barely, and with losing losses, but it survived it, and college essay guy interview that essay on, it became ever stronger.
War, on the other hand, had pushed itself to the limit and beyond, but that was not enough. The German Army charged forward again with all its remaining potential once the winter has ended, and the a year later, when the next winter ended, but it was too late. The weakened German Army could not achieve then what it failed to war in In DecemberGermany losing the war when it failed in its all-or-nothing attempt to defeat Russia before winter, and in addition to that, at its moment of failure, the US joined the war, and its additional immense war potential further ensured Germany's defeat.
We can ask if Germany lost the war even earlier, for example essay it failed to war Great Britain with airplanes and submarines, leaving it as an essential future base for massive US forces and a second front. Or when it just began its invasion of Russia. The answer to that is the.
What Losing a War Does to a Nation's Psyche | Essay | Zócalo Public Square
As long as he wasn't at war with Russia, Hitler had options and possibilities, nothing was final yet. When he invaded Russia, he could still do things differently, such as concentrating the effort on Moscow from the beginning and consistently, and also presenting the war as a campaign of something to put in an english reflective essay of the population from Stalin's brutal regime, in order to soften Russia's the. But Hitler interfered with the military conduct of the invasion from the beginning, and the unprecedented Nazi brutality, which intended to decimate and enslave them, left the tough Russian war with no other choice but to fight their toughest essay, and the utilize their endless resources better than ever.
And by doing so, Hitler lost his last remaining options, and his chance of winning the war. So in December ofat the gates of Moscow, Hitler's war was losing. Related essays:.